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I. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS BEFORE 1982
Aboriginal rights are rights held by aboriginal peoples, not by
virtue of Crown grant, legislation or treaty, but “by reason of the fact
that aboriginal peoples were once independent, self-governing enti-
ties in possession of most of the lands now making up Canada.”1 It
is, of course, the presence of aboriginal peoples in North America
before the arrival of the Europeans that distinguishes them from
other minority groups in Canada, and explains why their rights
have special legal status. However, the extent to which those rights
had survived European settlement was in considerable doubt until
as late as 1973, which was when the Supreme Court of Canada
decided the Calder case.2 In that case, six of the seven judges held
that the Nishga people of British Columbia possessed aboriginal
rights to their lands that had survived European settlement. The
actual outcome of the case was inconclusive, because the six judges
split evenly on the question whether the rights had been validly
extinguished or not. However, the recognition of the rights was sig-
nificant, and caught the attention of the Government of Canada,
which began to negotiate treaties (now called land claims agree-
ments) with First Nations in those parts of the country that were
without treaties. That resumed a policy that had been abandoned
in the 1920s, when the last numbered treaty was entered into.
Calder was followed in 1984 by the Guerin case,3 where the
Supreme Court of Canada recognized the title of the Musqueam
Indian Band to land in British Columbia. In that case, Dickson C.J.
described aboriginal title as “a legal right derived from the Indians’
historic occupation and possession of their tribal lands.”4 In that
case, the Band had surrendered its title to the Crown in order to
enable the land to be leased to a golf club. The Crown had leased
the land to the golf club, but on terms less favourable than those
1 B. Slattery, “The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights”
(1983) 8 Queen’s L.J. 232, 242.
2 Calder v. A.G.B.C. [1973] S.C.R. 313.
3 Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
4 Id., 376.
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agreed to by the Band. The Court held that the Crown had broken
a fiduciary duty owed to the Band, and that the Band was entitled
to damages from the Crown. Although this case was decided in
1984, it did not depend on section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
which was not in force at the time of the surrender and was not
relied upon by the Court.
After Calder and Guerin, we could confidently say that the
common law of Canada recognized aboriginal rights, and the courts
would grant remedies for breach of those rights. But we also had to
say that those rights had little constitutional protection.
Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 granted legisla-
tive authority to the Parliament of Canada over “Indians, and lands
reserved for the Indians.” Obviously, this provision gave law-making
authority to Parliament over aboriginal peoples and their lands.
Nor did it deny provincial power to enact laws of general application
that could apply to aboriginal peoples and their lands. For example,
a provincial law restricting the right to practise medicine applied
to Indians and on Indian reserves.5 So did provincial labour laws6
and traffic laws.7 However, not all provincial laws could apply of
their own force to aboriginal peoples and their lands. The courts
held that provincial laws that affected “Indianness” were incompe-
tent to the provinces.8 This notion was vague, but it would certainly
include provincial laws that purported to extinguish or derogate
from aboriginal or treaty rights. Thus, section 91(24) did impose
some limits on provincial power over aboriginal and treaty rights.
Unfortunately, section 88 of the federal Indian Act partly removed
that protection by providing that provincial laws of general appli-
cation were applicable to “Indians in the province,” thus giving the
status of federal law to provincial laws of general application. Treaty
rights were expressly exempted from section 88, and Indian lands
were not mentioned at all, but section 88 was open to the interpre-
5 R. v. Hill (1907) 15 O.L.R. 406 (Ont. C.A.).
6 Four B Manufacturing v. United Garment Workers [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031.
7 R. v. Francis [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025.
8 For an account of the Indianness cases, see Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional
Law of Canada (5th ed. supplemented), sec. 27.2(b).
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tation that provincial law could derogate from at least some kinds
of aboriginal rights.9
Aboriginal and treaty rights were certainly vulnerable to federal
laws. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, when applied to
laws enacted under section 91(24), meant that aboriginal rights
could always be extinguished or modified by Parliament. As was the
case with private property generally, there was no constitutional
requirement of compensation or prior consent or even consulta-
tion as a precondition to legislative expropriation. Even Indian
treaty rights, although recognized by section 88 of the Indian Act,
and protected from derogation by provincial law by section 88,10
could be extinguished by federal law without compensation, con-
sent or consultation. And, of course, aboriginal or treaty rights could
be extinguished or modified by constitutional amendment—and
the representatives of aboriginal peoples had no right to participate
in the process of constitutional amendment.
II. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1982
The Constitution Act, 1982 supplied the constitutional protec-
tion that was lacking at common law. As enacted in 1982, section 35
provided:
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peo-
ples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, “aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes the Indian,
Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada. 
This provision emerged late in the process of drafting the Con-
stitution Act, 1982. It was not in the October 1980 version of the
bill. It was in the April 1981 version, but without the word “exist-
ing.” The entire provision was then dropped from the November 5,
1981 version, which was the first version of the bill to achieve the
agreement of most of the provinces. The omission attracted severe
9 For an account of s. 88, see Hogg, previous note, sec. 27.3.
10 R. v. White and Bob (1965) 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481n (S.C.C.); Simon v. The
Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387.
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criticism, and later in November the first ministers agreed to restore
it, but with the addition of the word “existing.”
If the legislative history suggested less than total enthusiasm
by the first ministers for the constitutional protection of aboriginal
and treaty rights, the drafting also gave cause for concern. Section 35
was not in the Charter of Rights, which consisted of sections 1-34
of the Constitution Act, 1982. Whereas section 1 “guarantees” the
rights set out in the Charter, section 35 merely “recognized and
affirmed” aboriginal and treaty rights. When the phrase “recognized
and affirmed” was read with the word “existing,” which had been
added at the last moment, the language was open to the interpre-
tation that the status of aboriginal and treaty rights had not been
changed by their recognition and affirmation in the Constitution.
Thus section 35 did not provide an unambiguous answer to the big
question, which was: are aboriginal and treaty rights still vulnera-
ble to legislative extinguishment? That answer did come, however,
eight years later, when the Supreme Court of Canada decided R. v.
Sparrow (1990).11 That case, which will be discussed later in this
paper, interpreted the equivocal language of section 35 as provid-
ing a constitutional guarantee for aboriginal and treaty rights. They
were no longer vulnerable to legislative extinguishment. 
The Constitution Act, 1982 did include, in the Charter of Rights,
a provision dealing with aboriginal peoples. Section 25 provided
that the Charter of Rights was not to be construed as abrogating or
derogating from their aboriginal or treaty rights. The point of sec-
tion 25 was to allay the concern that the equality guarantee of sec-
tion 15 could be construed as invalidating rights that were limited
to aboriginal peoples. In effect, section 25 says that aboriginal and
treaty rights take priority over Charter rights. This provided a benign
explanation for the exclusion of section 35 from the Charter of
Rights. Of course, the exclusion of section 35 from the Charter of
Rights also had the effect of rendering the override clause of sec-
tion 33 inapplicable to aboriginal or treaty rights. (Section 1 of the
Charter of Rights, allowing reasonable limits to the rights, also had
no application to section 35 rights, but, as we shall see later in this
11 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
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paper, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Sparrow case incor-
porated a similar qualification into aboriginal and treaty rights.)
The Constitution Act, 1982, by Part V, enacted new amending
procedures that enabled the Constitution of Canada to be amended
by the Parliament and Legislatures, acting in various combina-
tions, depending on the kind of amendment. No role was accorded
to the representatives of First Nations in these new procedures.
Indeed, section 35 itself could be repealed or amended by the seven-
fifty formula of section 38, a procedure that required the coopera-
tive action of the two Houses of Parliament and the Legislative
Assemblies of seven provinces representing 50 per cent of the pop-
ulation. That was a difficult combination to achieve, to be sure, but
it could be achieved without the consent or consultation of the
aboriginal peoples who were the holders of the section 35 rights.
What the Constitution Act, 1982 did do, however, by section 37,
was to provide for a constitutional conference to be convened within
one year of the coming into force of the Act. The agenda for the
conference was to include “constitutional matters that directly
affect the aboriginal peoples of Canada, including the identifica-
tion and definition of the rights of those peoples to be included in
the Constitution of Canada.” The persons to be invited to the con-
ference consisted of the first ministers of Canada and the prov-
inces, as usual, but also the first ministers of the territories (who
had not in the past been included in first ministers’ meetings), and
representatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.
The conference mandated by section 37 was indeed convened
in March 1983, and it agreed upon several amendments to the
Constitution Act, 1982, which were duly passed by the appropriate
legislative bodies and proclaimed in force.12 Two new subsections
were added to section 35. New subsection (3) made clear that “treaty
rights” included rights in modern land claims agreements that exist
now “or may be so acquired.” That last phrase went some distance
to undermine the word “existing” in subsection (1). New subsec-
tion (4) made clear that aboriginal and treaty rights were “guaran-
teed equally to male and female persons.” The word “guaranteed”
12 Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1983, SI/84-102.
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went a considerable distance to strengthen the phrase “recognized
and affirmed” in subsection (1). These two changes may have been
unnecessary, but the choice of language showed that the aboriginal
negotiators had been very adept in surreptitiously shoring up the
deficiencies in the original language of section 35.
Another amendment that was agreed to in the March 1983 con-
ference was to replace section 37, which was now spent by the
holding of the March 1983 conference, with a new section 37.1.
New section 37.1 called for “at least two” additional constitutional
conferences to be convened to continue the discussions of “con-
stitutional matters that directly affect the aboriginal peoples of
Canada.” As with old section 37, representatives of the aboriginal
peoples were to be included in the conference. (These conferences
were in fact held in 1985 and 1987, and they attempted to agree on
language that would expressly recognize a right of aboriginal self-
government. Unfortunately, no agreement was achieved.)
The final amendment that was agreed to in the March 1983 con-
ference was the addition of a new section 35.1 to the Constitution
Act, 1982. Section 35.1 declares that federal and provincial govern-
ments are “committed to the principle” that, before any amend-
ment is made to section 91(24) or to section 35 or to section 25, a
constitutional conference will be convened to which representa-
tives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada will be invited to participate
in discussions of the proposed amendment. Through section 35.1,
aboriginal peoples have gained entry to the constitutional amend-
ment process. And, of course, they were the dominant negotiators
at the table when the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 proposed an
elaborate set of provisions to recognize “the inherent right of self-
government” and a process for defining it in detail through self-
government agreements. These self-government measures would
have been a great step forward for aboriginal rights. Unfortunately,
the Charlottetown Accord tried to deal with many other constitu-
tional issues as well, thus providing something for everyone to be
unhappy about, and it was defeated in the referendum that was
held to ratify it in 1992. 
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III. THE SPARROW CASE
The next (and perhaps most important) piece of the puzzle
was added by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
Sparrow (1990).13 In that case, a member of the Musqueam Indian
Band was charged with the offence of fishing with a drift net that
was longer than allowed by regulations made under the federal Fish-
eries Act. The Supreme Court of Canada decided that the defend-
ant was exercising an aboriginal right to fish. Did that protect the
defendant from the charge? That question required the Court for
the first time to address those troubling words in section 35 that
seemed to withhold full constitutional protection from aboriginal
and treaty rights. Those rights, it will be recalled, were not guaran-
teed, but merely “recognized and affirmed.” The Court held that
this phrase should be interpreted according to the principle that
treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally con-
strued and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the Indians.
The phrase should be read as incorporating the fiduciary obliga-
tion that government owes to the aboriginal peoples. From these two
premises, the Court concluded that the phrase should be inter-
preted as a constitutional guarantee of aboriginal and treaty rights.
As a constitutional guarantee, the phrase had the effect of nullify-
ing legislation that purported to abridge the aboriginal and treaty
rights that were recognized and affirmed by section 35.
What was the effect of that other troubling word in section 35,
namely, “existing”? Section 35 only guaranteed “existing aborigi-
nal and treaty rights.” The Court in Sparrow held that “existing”
meant “unextinguished.”14 Aboriginal and treaty rights that had
been validly extinguished before 1982 were not protected by sec-
tion 35. However, while the Court acknowledged that before 1982
the Parliament of Canada could extinguish aboriginal and treaty
rights by statute, the Court said that a federal statute would not be
13 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
14 Id., 1091.
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interpreted as producing that result unless the intention to extin-
guish was “clear and plain.” Although the Fisheries Act and regu-
lations prohibited fishing except under a statutory licence, and
closely regulated licensed fishing, the Court held that this did not
demonstrate a clear and plain intention to extinguish aboriginal
rights to fish. Nor was the regulatory regime held to be a partial extin-
guishment of aboriginal rights. So interpreted, the word “existing”
was not such a severe limitation on aboriginal and treaty rights as
had been feared before the decision.
Charter rights are subject to section 1, which authorizes “such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justi-
fied in a free and democratic society.” Because section 35 is not
part of the Charter of Rights, it is not subject to section 1. However,
the Court in Sparrow held that the section 35 rights were not
absolute. The section 35 rights could also be limited by statute if
the statute pursued a “compelling and substantial purpose,” and
infringed the aboriginal right no more than was necessary to achieve
the purpose. The standard of justification indicated by the Court
was very similar to the standard which had been constructed by
the Court for justification under section 1 of the Charter. In the
Sparrow case itself, the Court held that it did not have enough evi-
dence to determine whether the net-length restriction in the fish-
eries regulations would satisfy the standard of justification. The
Court ordered a new trial for the purpose of determining the issue
of justification. If the regulation passed the standard of justifica-
tion, then the aboriginal right would have been validly limited, and
the defendant would be convicted as charged. But if the regulation
could not be shown to serve a compelling purpose, or if it derogated
more severely from the aboriginal right than was necessary to
accomplish the purpose, then the regulation would be invalid for
inconsistency with section 35 and the defendant would be entitled
to be acquitted.15 
After the decision in Sparrow, it was finally clear that aborig-
inal rights were constitutionally protected. 
15 The same standard of justification enables derogation from treaty rights:
R. v. Badger [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771.
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IV. DEFINITION AND PROOF OF ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
Although aboriginal rights had been recognized and enforced
in Guerin and given constitutional protection in Sparrow, the
Supreme Court of Canada had made no real attempt to define their
characteristics, contenting itself by noting that aboriginal rights
were “unique” or “sui juris.”16 It was not until R. v. Van der Peet
(1996)17 that the Court provided the much-needed definition of
the aboriginal rights that were now guaranteed. In that case, Lamer
C.J., speaking for the majority of the Court, said that “in order to
be an aboriginal right an activity must be an element of a practice,
custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the abo-
riginal group asserting the right.”18 In order for a practice to be
“integral,” the practice must be “of central significance” to the
aboriginal society: it must be a “defining characteristic” of the soci-
ety, “one of the things that made the culture of the society distinc-
tive.”19 The practice must have developed before “contact,” that is,
“before the arrival of Europeans in North America.”20 However, the
practice could evolve over the years as the result of contact, for
example, the bone hook could be replaced by the steel hook, the
bow and arrow by the gun, and so on, but a practice that had evolved
into modern forms must trace its origins back to the pre-contact
period. Contemporary practices that had developed “solely as a
response to European influences” did not qualify.21
In Van der Peet, the aboriginal defendant had been convicted
of selling fish that she had caught under the authority of an Indian
food-fish licence. The licence, which had been issued under the
federal Fisheries Act, restricted the holder to fishing for food; the
sale of fish caught under the licence was prohibited by regulations
16 Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, 342; R. v. Sparrow [1990] 1
S.C.R. 1075, 1112.
17 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507.
18 Id., para. 45.
19 Id., para. 55.
20 Id., paras. 60-62.
21 Id., para. 73.
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made under the Act. The question for decision was whether the
defendant had an aboriginal right to sell fish. The Court found that
the exchange of fish did occur in the society of the Sto:lo people
before contact with Europeans, but it was incidental to their prac-
tice of fishing for food. It was not an “integral” part of the Sto:lo cul-
ture. It was only after contact that the Sto:lo people had begun
fishing to supply a market, a market that was created by European
demand for the fish. Therefore, the aboriginal defendant was unsuc-
cessful in establishing an aboriginal right to sell fish, and was prop-
erly convicted.22
The Van der Peet definition of aboriginal rights is based on the
existence of an aboriginal practice before “contact,” meaning before
the arrival of Europeans. This time frame does not work for Métis
rights, because Métis people, who originated in the intermarriage
of French Canadian men and Indian women during the fur trade
period, did not exist before contact. Lamer C.J. in Van der Peet
acknowledged this difficulty, and left open the question whether
the time frame would need to be modified for the purpose of iden-
tifying Métis rights.23 The alternative would be to hold that the
Métis had no aboriginal rights. A possible later time would be the
time of assertion of European sovereignty, which, as we shall see, is
the time at which aboriginal occupation of land must be established
in order to establish aboriginal title. However, that is not what the
Court decided. In R. v. Powley (2003),24 the Court held that, for
Métis claimants of aboriginal rights, the focus on European contact
had to be moved forward, not to the time of European sovereignty,
but to “the time of effective European control.”25 Apart from this
shift in the time frame, the same Van der Peet definition was to be
used to identify Métis rights.
22 Accord, R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672 (no aboriginal right to
sell fish); R. v. Gladstone [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (aboriginal right to sell herring
spawn on kelp); R. v. Adams [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 (aboriginal right to fish for
food); R. v. Côté [1996] 3 S.C.R. 169; Mitchell v. M.N.R. [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911
(no aboriginal right to trade across what is now the international border). 
23 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, para. 67.
24 [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207.
25 Id., para. 18.
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In Powley, two Métis claimed an aboriginal right to hunt for
food in the Sault Ste. Marie area of Ontario. The Court found that
effective control of the Upper Great Lakes area had passed from the
Indian and Métis people to the European settlers in approximately
1850. By that time, a distinctive Métis community had become
established in Sault Ste. Marie. The assertion of Crown sovereignty
over the area would have been in 1763, when the Treaty of Paris
ceded jurisdiction from the French to the British Crown. The Métis
community was not established that early. However, once the date
of effective control became the benchmark, the Métis practice of
hunting for food was by that time integral to the culture of an estab-
lished Métis community, and it had continued to the present time.
The Métis claimants were members of the modern community, they
traced their ancestry back to the pre-control community, and they
were entitled to the aboriginal right of hunting for food in the area.
Aboriginal title, which is the right to exclusive occupation of
land, is of course a species of aboriginal right. In Delgamuukw
v. British Columbia (1997),26 the Supreme Court confirmed that
essentially the same Van der Peet test is used to establish aborigi-
nal title as is used to establish more limited rights. It is based on the
historic occupation of the land by an aboriginal people. However,
the point of time at which aboriginal occupation of the land must
be proved is not the “European contact” test of Van der Peet, nor
the “European control” test of Powley. In Delgamuukw, the Court
said that “European sovereignty” was the point of time for the crys-
tallization of aboriginal title. The Court’s reasoning was that the
Crown’s underlying title to all land in Canada did not derive from
the time of contact. It only came into existence when sovereignty
was assumed by the Crown. Since aboriginal title had long been
recognized as a burden on the Crown’s underlying title, it came into
being at the same time as the Crown title, that is, on the assertion
of Crown sovereignty over a territory. So far as the common law
was concerned, “aboriginal title crystallized at the time sovereignty
26 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
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was asserted.”27 In British Columbia, that was 1846, when the Ore-
gon Boundary Treaty was entered into.
The proof of aboriginal rights, whatever the historic date stip-
ulated for their recognition today, is a serious problem for aborig-
inal claimants. In Delgamuukw, for example, the trial judge held
that the claimants had not established their exclusive occupation
in 1846, because he rejected as unreliable much of the oral evi-
dence that was tendered with respect to the aboriginal occupation
of the claimed land at the time of the assumption of European sov-
ereignty 150 years ago. However, the Supreme Court of Canada
pointed out that aboriginal societies did not keep written records
at the time of European sovereignty (or contact or control). Their
account of the past inevitably would be kept through “oral histo-
ries”—stories handed down from generation to generation in oral
form. To be sure, oral history is hearsay, but the rules of evidence
in aboriginal cases had to be adapted to the realities of pre-sover-
eignty aboriginal societies. The Court held that the factual findings
at trial could not stand, and that a new trial was required in which
oral histories would be admitted and given appropriate weight.
V. DUTY TO CONSULT ABORIGINAL PEOPLE
Section 35 protects aboriginal and treaty rights, but, as we have
seen, the proof of an aboriginal right (or title) can be a difficult and
lengthy process, and the negotiation of a treaty (land claims agree-
ment) can also be a difficult and lengthy process. Indeed, the two
processes are closely related and are often going on at the same time.
This is because the ability of a First Nation to negotiate a treaty will
depend on persuading government that there is a credible claim to
aboriginal title. During the period of proof and/or negotiation, which
will certainly take years and may take decades, the First Nation is
in an awkward situation. It is not yet able to invoke a proved abo-
riginal right or title, and it does not have a treaty. And yet logging or
mining activities, or other forms of development, on land claimed
by the First Nation, may diminish the value of the resource. Does
27 Id., para. 145.
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section 35 provide any interim protection for aboriginal interests
that are still unproved or under negotiation? The Supreme Court
of Canada has answered this question yes. Section 35 not only
guarantees existing aboriginal and treaty rights, it also imposes on
government the duty to engage in various processes even before an
aboriginal or treaty right is established. Section 35 gives constitu-
tional protection to a special relationship between the Crown and
aboriginal peoples under which the honour of the Crown must gov-
ern all dealings. The honour of the Crown entails a duty to negoti-
ate aboriginal claims with First Nations.28 And, while aboriginal
claims are unresolved, the honour of the Crown entails a duty to
consult, and if necessary accommodate the interests of, the abo-
riginal people, before authorizing action that could diminish the
value of the land or resources that they claim.
The duty to consult and accommodate is a remarkable exten-
sion of the protection of aboriginal rights. It was established in Haida
Nation v. British Columbia (2004).29 In that case, the government
of British Columbia had issued a licence to the Weyerhaeuser Com-
pany authorizing the company to cut trees on provincial Crown
land in the Queen Charlotte Islands. The Queen Charlotte Islands
were the traditional homeland of the Haida people. The Islands
were the subject of a land claim by the Haida Nation, which had been
accepted for negotiation but had not been resolved at the time of
the issue of the licence. The cutting of trees on the claimed land
would have the effect of depriving the Haida people of some of the
benefit of their land if and when their title was established. The
Court held that, in these circumstances, section 35 obliged the
Crown to consult with the Haida people, and, if necessary, accom-
modate their concerns. The extent of consultation and accommo-
dation “is proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength
of the case supporting the existence of the right or title, and to the
seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title
claimed.”30 In this case, a preliminary assessment indicated that
28 Haida Nation v. B.C. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, para. 20.
29 Previous note.
30 Id., para. 39.
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there was a prima facie case for aboriginal title and a strong prima
facie case for an aboriginal right to harvest the red cedar growing on
the Islands. The logging contemplated by the company’s licence,
which included old-growth red cedar, would have an adverse effect
on the claimed right. Since the province was aware of the Haida
claim at the time of issuing the licence, it was under a duty to con-
sult with the Haida before issuing the licence. Not having done so,
the Crown was in breach of section 35, and the licence was invalid.
The duty to consult, which applies to the Crown in right of
Canada and to the Crown in right of the province (but not private
parties), will lead to a further duty to accommodate where the con-
sultations indicate that the Crown should modify its proposed action
in order to accommodate aboriginal concerns. In Haida Nation,
since the required consultation never took place, the Court did not
have to decide whether consultation would have given rise to a duty
to accommodate. But the Court suggested that the circumstances
of the case “may well require significant accommodation to pre-
serve the Haida interest pending resolution of their claims.”31
In Haida Nation, the Supreme Court of Canada, while indicat-
ing that the precise nature of the consultation and accommodation
that was required would depend on the circumstances of the case,
emphasized that the duties of consultation and accommodation
did not involve a duty to agree with the aboriginal people.32 In the
absence of a proved aboriginal right (or a treaty right), the aborig-
inal people did not have a veto over the development of land in which
they claimed an interest. In the companion case of Taku River
Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (2004),33 a mining com-
pany applied to the British Columbia government for permission
to reopen an old mine in an area that was the subject of an unre-
solved land claim by the Taku River Tlingit First Nation. This appli-
cation triggered a statutory environmental assessment process,
which ended with approval of the application to reopen the mine.
The First Nation objected to the outcome. The Supreme Court
31 Id., para. 77.
32 Id., paras. 10, 42, 48, 49.
33 [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550.
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held that this was a case where there was a duty to consult and
accommodate: there was a prima facie case for the aboriginal claim,
and the reopening of the mine was potentially harmful to the claim.
However, the Crown’s duty had been discharged in this case. The
environmental assessment took three and a half years. The First
Nation was included in the process. Its concerns were fully explained
and were listened to in good faith, and the ultimate approval con-
tained measures to address the concerns. Although those measures
did not satisfy the First Nation, the process fulfilled the province’s
duty of consultation and accommodation. Meaningful consulta-
tion did not require agreement, and accommodation required only
a reasonable balance between the aboriginal concerns and com-
peting considerations.34
The Haida Nation duty to consult and accommodate was an
interim protection measure, designed to safeguard aboriginal inter-
ests while rights were in dispute or a treaty was under negotiation.
One might assume that the duty would fall away once a treaty had
been entered into, and the rights of the parties were spelled out in
writing. But the Supreme Court of Canada has held otherwise. In
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (2005),35 the federal govern-
ment proposed to build a road in a national park on federal Crown
land in northern Alberta. The route of the road was through the
traditional hunting grounds of the Mikisew Cree First Nation, which
objected to the project for that reason. The road proposal was all
within the Treaty 8 area of northern Alberta. Under Treaty 8, entered
into in 1899, the aboriginal people who lived in the territory had
surrendered the entire area to the federal Crown. In return, the
aboriginal people were promised reserves and some other benefits.
Treaty 8 gave to the aboriginal signatories (which included the
ancestors of the Mikisew Cree) the right to hunt, trap and fish
throughout the surrendered territory “saving and excepting such
tracts as may be required or taken up from time to time for settle-
ment, mining, lumbering, trading or other purposes.” The proposed
road involved an exercise of the Crown’s right to take up land
34 Id., para. 2.
35 [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388.
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under this clause. Was taking up land under the Treaty subject to a
constitutional duty of consultation? It was true, of course, that land
taken up for development would have the effect of diminishing the
area available to aboriginal people for hunting, trapping and fish-
ing, but that was what was agreed to in 1899. The Supreme Court of
Canada held, however, that “treaty making is an important stage in
the long process of reconciliation [of aboriginal and non-aboriginal
peoples], but it is only a stage”; and Treaty 8 was “not the complete
discharge of the duty arising from the honour of the Crown.”36
Where the exercise of treaty rights by the Crown could have an
“adverse impact” on aboriginal people, the honour of the Crown
required consultation with the affected people.37 In “appropriate”
cases (not defined), the duty of consultation would lead to a duty to
accommodate the aboriginal interests, although it did not require
that aboriginal consent be obtained. In this case, the diminution of
the Mikisew Cree’s hunting and trapping rights in their traditional
territory was a clear consequence of the proposed road. That adverse
impact triggered the duty of consultation and accommodation.
The discussions that had taken place between park officials and
the Mikisew Cree were not sufficient to satisfy that duty. The Court
quashed the minister’s decision to approve the road project and sent
the project back for reconsideration in accordance with the Court’s
reasons. 
Mikisew Cree is a striking extension of the duty to consult and
accommodate. The purpose of Treaty 8 and the other numbered
treaties was to provide certainty in the rights of the Crown and the
aboriginal peoples so as to open up land for settlement and devel-
opment. Obviously, the new duty is an important unwritten qual-
ification to the treaty language, and the duty is sufficiently vague
and open-ended to make compliance difficult. Since non-compli-
ance will invalidate a decision by the Crown, the certainty that is
the goal of treaty-making is diminished by the Mikisew Cree deci-
36 Id., para 54. Binnie J. for the Court added (para. 56) that “the 1899 nego-
tiations were the first step in a long journey that is unlikely to end any time
soon.”
37 An adverse impact did not include one that was “remote or unsubstantial”:
Id., para. 55.
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sion. The Court did not discuss the value of certainty, but it obvi-
ously preferred to view treaties as a stage in a long process of
reconciliation rather than the final step in that process. And the
Court did make clear that “any administrative inconvenience inci-
dental to managing the process” is irrelevant.38 Modern compre-
hensive treaties (land claims agreements) tend to emphasize the
goal of certainty. They are much more detailed than the old num-
bered treaties, and they provide for consultation and dispute res-
olution processes. However, based on Mikisew Cree, it is likely that
some residue of the honour of the Crown will impose additional
unwritten obligations on the Crown in its implementation of the
treaties.
VI. CONCLUSION
I venture the conclusion that no area of Canadian law has been
so transformed in such a short period of time as the law of aborig-
inal rights. Rights that were undefined and barely recognized in
1973, and were in any case vulnerable to legislative and constitu-
tional extinguishment, have in the short space of little more than
30 years become powerful, constitutionally-protected rights. This
process was started by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
in the Calder and Guerin cases. It moved forward with the enactment
of the Constitution Act, 1982, which stated in section 35 that “exist-
ing” aboriginal and treaty rights were “recognized and affirmed.”
This tentative language was taken by an active Supreme Court in
Sparrow and converted into a constitutional guarantee of aborig-
inal rights. The indeterminacy of the rights was tackled by the Court
in Van der Peet, which provided a definition that was judicially
enforceable. The definition was refined in Powley to accommodate
Métis rights and in Delgamuukw to accommodate aboriginal title.
And, in Delgamuukw, new rules of evidence were announced to
recognize the reality that societies that lacked written records when
the white man arrived had to be permitted to prove their claims by
oral histories. The final development is the judicial creation in Haida
38 Id., para. 50.
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Nation of a duty of consultation, which provides interim protec-
tion for the lands, forests and fishing grounds that are claimed by
aboriginal peoples, even before any aboriginal right has been estab-
lished in court. 
By the standards of constitutional lawyers, this has been a wild
ride! Although it appears as a series of extraordinary victories for
aboriginal people, the fact is that the only truly enduring settlement
of aboriginal claims is the treaty. Many parts of the country have
treaties, although the old treaties are so brief and vague that they
are not much of an improvement on aboriginal rights. The modern
treaty-making process, which leads to modern land claims agree-
ments and self-government agreements, is well under way in many
parts of the country. Only a treaty can properly structure a rational
scheme of cooperative governance for federal, provincial and abo-
riginal governments to control, preserve and manage the resources
on aboriginal and adjacent lands. The enormous detail of the thick
volume that contains a typical modern land claims agreement tes-
tifies to the impossibility of regulating aboriginal rights through lit-
igation. As well, only a treaty can provide the basis for aboriginal
self-government, including the taxing powers and funding entitle-
ments that will make the aboriginal government a true partner
with the federal and provincial governments. This is where the real
advances for aboriginal rights will come from: by converting them
into treaty rights, which are agreed to by all parties, which are suf-
ficiently detailed to provide guides to action, which provide for the
cooperation of all three levels of government in the management of
the resources, and which provide self-government powers and sta-
ble financing for the aboriginal level of government.
30-Lajoie.book  Page 196  Mardi, 20. mai 2008  12:26 12
